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4/22/04 - Crime Victims' Rights Act, S. 2329 passed
in the Senate by 96 - 1 vote!
S 2329 HDS
108th
CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 2329
To protect
crime victims' rights.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED
STATES
April
21, 2004
Mr. KYL
(for himself, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. HATCH, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. FRIST, Mr. DASCHLE,
Mr. MCCONNELL, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. DEWINE, Mr.
FEINGOLD, Mr. CRAIG, Mr. KERRY, Mr. GRAHAM of South Carolina, Mr. SCHUMER, Ms.
COLLINS, Mr. BAYH, Mr. LIEBERMAN, Mrs. CLINTON, Mr. PRYOR, Ms. STABENOW, and
Mr. NELSON of Florida) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
ordered held at the desk
A BILL
To protect
crime victims' rights.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act
may be cited as the `Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna
Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims' Rights Act'.
SEC.
2. CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS.
(a)
Amendment to Title 18- Part II of title 18, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end the following:
`CHAPTER 237--CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS
`Sec.
`3771.
Crime victims' rights.
`Sec.
3771. Crime victims' rights
`(a)
RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS- A crime victim has the following rights:
`(1)
The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.
`(2)
The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public
proceeding involving the crime or of any release or escape of the accused.
`(3)
The right not to be excluded from any such public proceeding.
`(4)
The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding involving
release, plea, or sentencing.
`(5)
The right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case.
`(6)
The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.
`(7)
The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.
`(8)
The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's
dignity and privacy.
`(b)
RIGHTS AFFORDED- In any court proceeding involving an offense against a
crime victim, the court shall ensure that the crime victim is afforded the
rights described in subsection (a). The reasons for any decision denying
relief under this chapter shall be clearly stated on the record.
`(c)
BEST EFFORTS TO ACCORD RIGHTS-
`(1)
GOVERNMENT- Officers and employees of the Department of Justice and other
departments and agencies of the United States engaged in the detection,
investigation, or prosecution of crime shall make their best efforts to
see that crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the rights described
in subsection (a).
`(2)
CONFLICT- In the event of any material conflict of interest between the
prosecutor and the crime victim, the prosecutor shall advise the crime
victim of the conflict and take reasonable steps to direct the crime
victim to the appropriate legal referral, legal assistance, or legal aid
agency.
`(3)
NOTICE- Notice of release otherwise required pursuant to this chapter
shall not be given if such notice may endanger the safety of any person.
`(d)
ENFORCEMENT AND LIMITATIONS-
`(1)
RIGHTS- The crime victim, the crime victim's lawful representative, and
the attorney for the Government may assert the rights established in this
chapter. A person accused of the crime may not obtain any form of relief
under this chapter.
`(2)
MULTIPLE CRIME VICTIMS- In a case where the court finds that the number of
crime victims makes it impracticable to accord all of the crime victims
the rights contained in this chapter, the court shall fashion a procedure
to give effect to this chapter.
`(3)
WRIT OF MANDAMUS- If a Federal court denies any right of a crime victim
under this chapter or under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
Government or the crime victim may apply for a writ of mandamus to the
appropriate court of appeals. The court of appeals shall take up and
decide such application forthwith and shall order such relief as may be
necessary to protect the crime victim's ability to exercise the rights.
`(4)
ERROR- In any appeal in a criminal case, the Government may assert as
error the district court's denial of any crime victim's right in the
proceeding to which the appeal relates.
`(5)
NEW TRIAL- In no case shall a failure to afford a right under this chapter
provide grounds for a new trial.
`(6)
NO CAUSE OF ACTION- Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
authorize a cause of action for damages.
`(e)
DEFINITIONS- For the purposes of this chapter, the term `crime victim' means
a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a
Federal offense. In the case of a crime victim who is under 18 years of age,
incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased, the legal guardians of the crime
victim or the representatives of the crime victim's estate, family members,
or any other persons appointed as suitable by the court, may assume the
crime victim's rights under this chapter, but in no event shall the
defendant be named as such guardian or representative.
`(f)
PROCEDURES TO PROMOTE COMPLIANCE-
`(1)
REGULATIONS- Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this
chapter, the Attorney General of the United States shall promulgate
regulations to enforce the rights of crime victims and to ensure
compliance by responsible officials with the obligations described in law
respecting crime victims.
`(2)
CONTENTS- The regulations promulgated under paragraph (1) shall--
`(A)
establish an administrative authority within the Department of Justice
to receive and investigate complaints relating to the provision or
violation of the rights of a crime victim;
`(B)
require a course of training for employees and offices of the Department
of Justice that fail to comply with provisions of Federal law pertaining
to the treatment of crime victims, and otherwise assist such employees
and offices in responding more effectively to the needs of crime
victims;
`(C)
contain disciplinary sanctions, including suspension or termination from
employment, for employees of the Department of Justice who willfully or
wantonly fail to comply with provisions of Federal law pertaining to the
treatment of crime victims; and
`(D)
provide that the Attorney General, or the designee of the Attorney
General, shall be the final arbiter of the complaint, and that there
shall be no judicial review of the final decision of the Attorney
General by a complainant.'.
(b)
TABLE OF CHAPTERS- The table of chapters for part II of title 18, United
States Code, is amended by inserting at the end the following:
3771'.
(c)
REPEAL- Section 502 of the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 (42
U.S.C. 10606) is repealed.
SEC.
3. INCREASED RESOURCES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS.
(a)
CRIME VICTIMS LEGAL ASSISTANCE GRANTS- The Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42
U.S.C. 10601 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 1404C the
following:
`SEC.
1404D. CRIME VICTIMS LEGAL ASSISTANCE GRANTS.
`(a) IN
GENERAL- The Director may make grants as provided in section 1404(c)(1)(A)
to State, tribal, and local prosecutors' offices, law enforcement agencies,
courts, jails, and correctional institutions, and to qualified public and
private entities, to develop, establish, and maintain programs for the
enforcement of crime victims' rights as provided in law.
`(b)
FALSE CLAIMS ACT- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, amounts
collected pursuant to sections 3729 through 3731 of title 31, United States
Code (commonly known as the `False Claims Act'), may be used for grants
under this section.'.
(b)
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS- In addition to funds made available under
section 1402(d) of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984, there are authorized to
be appropriated to carry out this Act--
(1)
$2,000,000 for fiscal year 2005 and $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years
2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 to United States Attorneys Offices for
Victim/Witnesses Assistance Programs;
(2)
$2,000,000 for fiscal year 2005 and $5,000,000 in each of the fiscal years
2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, to the Office for Victims of Crime of the
Department of Justice for enhancement of the Victim Notification System;
(3)
$300,000 in fiscal year 2005 and $500,000 for each of the fiscal years
2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, to the Office for Victims of Crime of the
Department of Justice for staff to administer the appropriation for the
support of the National Crime Victim Law Institute or other organizations
as designated under paragraph (4);
(4)
$7,000,000 for fiscal year 2005 and $11,000,000 for each of the fiscal
years 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, to the Office for Victims of Crime of
the Department of Justice, for the support of--
(A)
the National Crime Victim Law Institute and the establishment and
operation of the Institute's programs to provide counsel for victims in
criminal cases for the enforcement of crime victims' rights in Federal
jurisdictions, and in States and tribal governments that have laws
substantially equivalent to the provisions of chapter 237 of title 18,
United States Code; or
(B)
other organizations substantially similar to that organization as
determined by the Director of the Office for Victims of Crime.
(c)
INCREASED RESOURCES TO DEVELOP STATE-OF-THE-ART SYSTEMS FOR NOTIFYING CRIME
VICTIMS OF IMPORTANT DATES AND DEVELOPMENTS- The Victims of Crime Act of
1984 (42 U.S.C. 10601 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 1404D
the following:
`SEC.
1404E. CRIME VICTIMS NOTIFICATION GRANTS.
`(a) IN
GENERAL- The Director may make grants as provided in section 1404(c)(1)(A)
to State, tribal, and local prosecutors' offices, law enforcement agencies,
courts, jails, and correctional institutions, and to qualified public or
private entities, to develop and implement state-of-the-art systems for
notifying victims of crime of important dates and developments relating to
the criminal proceedings at issue in a timely and efficient manner, provided
that the jurisdiction has laws substantially equivalent to the provisions of
chapter 237 of title 18, United States Code.
`(b)
INTEGRATION OF SYSTEMS- Systems developed and implemented under this section
may be integrated with existing case management systems operated by the
recipient of the grant.
`(c)
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS- In addition to funds made available under
section 1402(d), there are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this
section--
`(1)
$5,000,000 for fiscal year 2005; and
`(2)
$5,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009.
`(d)
FALSE CLAIMS ACT- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, amounts
collected pursuant to sections 3729 through 3731 of title 31, United States
Code (commonly known as the `False Claims Act'), may be used for grants
under this section.'.
SEC.
4. REPORTS.
(a)
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS- Not later than 1 year
after the date of enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, for each Federal court,
shall report to Congress the number of times that a right established in
chapter 237 of title 18, United States Code, is asserted in a criminal case
and the relief requested is denied and, with respect to each such denial,
the reason for such denial, as well as the number of times a mandamus action
is brought pursuant to chapter 237 of title 18, and the result reached.
(b)
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE-
(1)
STUDY- The Comptroller General shall conduct a study that evaluates the
effect and efficacy of the implementation of the amendments made by this
Act on the treatment of crime victims in the Federal system.
(2)
REPORT- Not later than 3 years after the date of enactment of this Act,
the Comptroller General shall prepare and submit to the appropriate
committees a report containing the results of the study conducted under
subsection (a).
END
Nation's Top Prosecutors' and Police Organizations Support
Crime Victims' Rights Amendment
The
National District Attorneys' Association (NDAA) and Fraternal Order of Police
(FOB) have both formally endorsed U. S. Senate Joint Resolution 1, (and its
companion resolution in the U. S. House of Representatives, H. J. Res. 48) the
Crime Victims' Rights proposed Amendment to the U. S. Constitution.
Support by
the leading National organizations, representing local prosecutors and the
rank-and-file law enforcement officers, is a major step toward the enactment
and recognition of the need for fundamental rights for crime victims in the
U.S. Constitution.
The NDAA
represents approximately 30,000 prosecutors. The Fraternal Order of Police is
the world's largest organization of sworn law enforcement officers, with over
310,000 members in more than 2,100 lodges.
* * *
The NDAA
resolution, was adopted overwhelmingly by a voice vote and states:
VICTIM
RIGHTS AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT
WHEREAS,
the local prosecutors of America are responsible for the vast
majority
of criminal prosecutions in the United States; and
WHEREAS,
as prosecutors our fundamental role is to pursue justice and
protect
the public safety by holding criminal offenders accountable for their
violations of the law; and
WHEREAS,
in carrying out these responsibilities, prosecutors represent
both the
interests of the public and the individual victims of criminal activity; and
WHEREAS,
now as in the past, prosecutors throughout America are in the
forefront
of initiatives to recognize, expand and protect the rights of victims of
crime.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT
RESOLVED, That the National District Attorneys Association (NDAA),
representing America’s prosecutors, supports the adoption of S.J. Res. l (and
its companion in the U. S. House of Representatives, H. J. Res. 48) the Crime
Victims Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution and call upon the
Congress to pass the amendment and the States to ratify it.
Adopted by
the Board of Directors, March 20, 2004 (Ft. Lauderdale, FL)
-
San Juan Capistrano
Becomes First City to Endorse VRA
On January 6, 2004, the City Council of San Juan Capistrano, CA, formally
stated its support for S.J. Res. 1 and H.J. Res. 48, both of which would
amend the U.S. Constitution to provide fundamental rights for crime victims.
At the urging of former mayor Colleen Campbell, San Juan Capistrano became
the first city government to formally support the amendment.
The City's resolution reads:
Whereas, the rights of victims of violent crime are currently
under represented in the United States Constitution; and,
Whereas, a United States Constitutional Amendment has been
proposed to protect the rights of violent crime victims; and,
Whereas, the proposed Amendment has received bipartisan support
of the 108th United States Congress; and,
Whereas, the United States President George W. Bush announced
his support for the proposed Constitutional Amendment; and,
Whereas, the City Council of the City of San Juan Capistrano
voted unanimously to endorse the Constitutional Amendment at their meeting
of December 2, 2003, and is believed to be the first City in the United
Statesto formally support the Amendment.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the City Council of the
City of San Juan Capistrano does hereby formally state its support for the
108th United States Congress, Joint Resolution 1, introduced by Senators
Jon Kyl and Dianne Feinstein and Joint House of Representatives Joint
Resolution 48, sponsored by Representative Steve Chabot...
###########################################
-
U.S.
Constitution Amendment Testimony, April 6, 2003
Given before the United
States Senate Judiciary, Washington, DC
by
Collene (Thompson) Campbell
Our only
son is dead because of a weak and a criminal forgiving justice system.
We may
be one of the hardest hit crime victim’s families in the Nation, but we are
just one family out of hundreds of thousands.
We
continue to be deeply saddened by all four of the 9-11 terrorists attacks.
It is inconceivable to realize that every ten weeks there are as many people
murdered right here in America as were killed in all four of the horrible
attacks.
Our son,
Scott, was strangled and thrown from an airplane by two repeat felony
criminals and we never found his body.
My
Brother, my only sibling, auto racing legend Mickey Thompson and his wife,
Trudy, were shot to death as they were simply leaving their home on their
way to work in the morning. For any family to deal with murder, is near
impossible. However, to allow the American justice system to add additional
pain is intolerable and shameful.
My small
family consists of proud Americans. Since the American Revolution, our
family has fought in every major war, for equality and the freedom for all
Americans of this great Nation. We have worked hard, contributed greatly
and never asked for a hand out from anyone. My family believed the U.S.
Constitution was written to protect, balance and establish justice, yes,
establish justice … And, that is true, it does establish
justice…unless, and until, you have the misfortune of becoming a victim of
crime.
Like so many others, there has been tremendous pain to our
family, and coupled with that grief, is the fact, that the moment we became
victims of crime, our rights are ignored in favor of a killer. That
means, a murderer or a rapist has rights not afforded to victims, all
because we, the victim, are not mentioned in our U.S. Constitution.
My husband and I were not permitted to be in the courtroom
during three trials for the men who murdered our son. We were forced to
sit in the hall, like a dog with fleas. Yet, the killers, along with
all their family and supporters, were inside the courtroom portraying a
family unit.
We were not allowed to be heard, yet, the killer’s family was
able to testify in front of the jury, proclaiming the goodness of the
defendant and the evil of victims.
We were not notified of a hearing before the District Court of
Appeal. Therefore, no one was there to represent our murdered son, however,
in full force, forty members of the killer’s contingency, were present. The
murder case was then overturned. There was to be another trial, the killer
was released, without consideration for our safety, and we learned of
all this through the media. I called the Attorney General’s Prosecutor on
our case and asked why she hadn’t bothered calling or notifying us regarding
the appeal. Her answer was demeaning, but typical, she said: “We never
notify the victims, they simply don’t understand”. However, we knew the
true reason, . . .. unlike the killer’s defense, she was not
required to notify us, because we were only the Mom and Dad of the
murdered victim…the next of kin!
Our
family would never ask for restitution, our son’s life does not have a
dollar value. However, among other significant costs, we had to cough up
$2,000.00 to get his car out of storage, (after it had been impounded by the
police for evidence). The trials took eight years to complete, while our
life was controlled by the defense. There was no consideration for our
devastated personal life, plans, family or finances. But, I can guarantee
you, we and thousands of other victims are the product of others before us
doing nothing. Hopefully you are not willing to continue that
pattern.
You
rarely hear from people like us, because victims are too devastated to
talk. We have no financial help or attorneys representing us. Unlike the
defense attorney’s associations we are unable to contribute to legislators.
The victims are forced to fend for themselves.
Senators, what we victims fail to understand, is how, in this great Nation,
we have allowed the violent criminals, and their defense attorneys, to have
more rights than the honest, law-abiding good American citizen, who through
no fault of their own, has become a victim of violent crime. I’m certain
this is not what the Founders of this Great Nation and the authors of our
Constitution intended and it needs to be corrected immediately.
At a
huge cost to taxpayers and to our life personally, our family has
continually been in the court system for 21 straight years, and still
have no right for a speedy trial. There is no end in sight.
I’m
uncertain how long our family can endure the inequities and injustice that
prevails in our courts today. We, the unfortunate victims, do not have an
organization like the ACLU or funds supplied by defense attorneys. We
only have the honesty and integrity of good Americans asking for a
balanced justice system.
We ask you to move forward rapidly with the proposed
Constitutional Amendment that will protect and give some of the same rights
to crime victims, as those afforded to accused violent criminals. The
amendment we seek does not take away any rights from the criminal.
It is
appalling that a vicious murderer has more rights than law-abiding American
citizens. Unfortunately, the justice system has been altered, until it is
now broken.
On behalf of all crime victims, thank you for allowing me to be
heard.
A
special thanks to my own California Senator, Dianne Feinstein and to Arizona
Senator Jon Kyl, for having the insight, courage and integrity to carry this
amendment.
###########################################
Mrs.
FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, last week, during the debate on a proposed
constitutional amendment to protect the rights of crime victims, Senator
LEAHY made several lengthy statements challenging some of the facts set
forth by supporters of the amendment, including myself. We responded to many
of those arguments at the time--and, I believe, refuted them. I do want not
burden the record now by repeating all our contentions or making new ones.
However, there is one argument that the
Senator from Vermont made during the waning hours of debate on the amendment
that I find particularly troubling. It involves the role of victims in
criminal proceedings at the time our Constitution was written. Because I
believe the Senator's comments contradict the clear weight of American
history, I feel compelled to respond.
Here is the argument Senator LEAHY
disputes: At the time the Constitution was written, the bulk of prosecutions
were by private individuals. Typically, a crime was committed and then the
victim initiated and then pursued that criminal case. Because victims were
parties to most criminal cases, they enjoyed the basic rights to notice, to
be present, and to be heard under regular court rules. Given the fact that
victims already had basic rights in criminal proceedings, it is perhaps
understandable that the Framers of our Constitution did not think to provide
victims with protection in our national charter.
The Senator from Vermont tried to rebut
this argument. Citing an encyclopedia article and a couple of law review
articles, he claimed that, by the time of the Constitutional Convention,
public prosecution was ``standard'' and private prosecution had largely
disappeared.
Because Senator LEAHY's comments suggest
that some confusion about this issue lingers among my colleagues, I would
now like to provide some additional evidence demonstrating that private
prosecutions had not only not largely disappeared in the late 18th century
but in fact were the norm.
First, it is important to concede one
point: some public prosecutors did exist at the time of the framing of the
Constitution. Certainly, by then, the office of public prosecutor had been
established in some of the colonies--such as Connecticut, Vermont, and
Virginia. But just because some public prosecutors existed in the late 18th
century does not mean that they played a major role or that public
prosecution had supplanted private prosecution. In fact, criminal
prosecution in 18th century English and colonial courts consisted primarily
of private suits by victims. Such prosecutions continued in many States
throughout much of the 19th century.
Thus, contrary to Senator LEAHY's
suggestion that a ``system of public prosecutions'' was ``standard'' at the
time of the framing of the Constitution, the evidence is clear that private
individuals--victims--initiated and pursued the bulk of prosecutions before,
during, and for some time after the Constitution Convention.
Let's look, for example, at the research of
one scholar, Professor Allen Steinberg, who spent a decade sifting through
dusty criminal court records in Philadelphia and wrote a book about his
findings. Based on a detailed review of court docket books and other
evidence, Professor Steinberg determined that private prosecutions continued
in that city through most of the 19th century.
In Professor Steinberg's words, by the
mid-19th Century, ``private prosecution had become central to the city's
system of criminal law enforcement, so entrenched that it would prove
difficult to dislodge. .....''
Of course, Philadelphia was the city where
the Constitution was debated, drafted, and adopted. And for decades it was
our new nation's most populous city--and its cultural and legal capital as
well.
It is difficult to reconcile the assertion
that a ``system of public prosecutions'' was ``standard'' at the time of the
Constitution Convention with historical research showing that, in the same
city where the Convention was held, private prosecutions--inherited from
English common law--continued to be ``standard'' through the mid-19th
century.
It is not surprising that the Senator from
Vermont would conclude that public prosecution had replaced private
prosecution by the late 18th century. A cursory exam of historical documents
might lead to such a conclusion, for the simple reason that documents
regarding public prosecutors and public prosecutions (what few there were)
are easier to find than documents regarding private prosecutions. As
Stephanie Dangel has explained in the Yale Law Journal:
[e]arly studies concentrating on
legislation naturally over-emphasized the importance of the public
prosecutor, since a private prosecution system inherited from the common law
would not appear in legislation. Examinations of prosecutorial practice were
cursory and thus skewed. The most readily accessible information relating to
criminal prosecutions predictably concerned the exceptional, well publicized
cases involving public prosecutors, not the vast majority of mundane cases,
involving scant paperwork and handled through the simple procedures of
private prosecution .....
Dangel has summed up recent historical
research into the nature of prosecution in the decades leading up to the
framing of the Constitution as follows:
First, private individuals, not government
officials, conducted the bulk of prosecution. Second, the primary work of
attorneys general and district attorneys consisted on non-prosecutorial
duties, with their prosecutorial discretion limited to ending, rather than
initiating or conducting, prosecutions.
Regarding the prevalence of private
prosecution in the colonies, Dangel noted:
Seventeenth and eighteenth century English
common law viewed a crime as a wrong inflicted upon the victims not as an
act against the state. An aggrieved victim, or interested party, would
initiate prosecution. After investigation and approval by a justice of the
peace and grand jury, a private individual would conduct the prosecution,
sometimes with the assistance of counsel....... Private parties retained
ultimate control, often settling even after grand juries returned
indictments. Contemporaneous sources confirm the relative insignificance of
public prosecutions in the colonial criminal system. Only five of the first
thirteen constitutions mention a state attorney general, and only
Connecticut mentions the local prosecutor. Secondary references are
similarly rare. Finally, the earliest judicial decision voicing disapproval
of private prosecution did not appear until 1849. No decision affirming
public prosecutors' virtually unreviewable discretion appeared before 1883.
The historical evidence is clear: Because
victims were parties to most criminal prosecutions in the late 18th century,
they had basic rights to notice, to be present, and to participate in the
proceedings under regular court rules. Today, victims are not parties to
criminal prosecutions, and they are often denied these basic rights. Thus, a
constitutional victims' rights amendment would restore some of the rights
that victims enjoyed at the time the Framers drafted the Constitution and
Bill of Rights.
If this historical evidence about
prosecutions in the colonies is not enough, I would repeat a point Senator
LEAHY [Page: S3250] made himself last week: that in England, any crime
victim had the right to initiate and conduct criminal proceedings all the
way up to the middle of the 19th century. As we know from Senator BYRD's
enlightening remarks last week, many of the rights and liberties of our
Constitution--such as those for criminal defendants--have their roots in
English history and the English constitution.
Given the fact, then, that virtually all
the protections for criminal defendants in the Bill of Rights have English
antecedents--including habeas corpus, trial by jury, due process,
prohibition against excessive fines, and so on--it is hardly a stretch to
think that the lack of rights for crime victims in the Bill of Rights would
reflect an English antecedent as well: the long-established right of victims
to prosecute crimes themselves.
Let me be clear: I do not support a return
to the old system of private prosecution. My only point is that we can
cogently explain why the Framers did not include a single word on behalf of
crime victims in the Constitution. And, given the relatively recent
development in the United States of a system of 100% public prosecution, we
can offer strong reasons to restore basic rights for victims in our criminal
justice system.
Just so there is no more confusion on this
point, let us return to Professor Allen Steinberg, a legal historian who
researched and wrote a 326-page book on prosecutions in 19th century
Philadelphia--the most in-depth study of private prosecution in the United
States.
Did Professor Steinberg find that public
prosecution was ``standard'' in Philadelphia even decades after the
Constitution and Bill of Rights were adopted, as Senator LEAHY suggests? No.
In fact, he found that victims directly prosecuted crimes in Philadelphia
until at least 1875.
The fact that Professor Steinberg's
research is on Philadelphia is undeniably important. Not only did the
Framers live in Philadelphia while debating and drafting the Constitution,
but many had resided there earlier as well.
For example, James Madison--sometimes
called the Father of our Constitution--was not only a delegate at the
Philadelphia Convention, he served in the Continental Congress in
Philadelphia from March 1780 through December 1783. I have little doubt that
Madison knew that the bulk of criminal prosecutions in Philadelphia
consisted of private prosecutions. Here is what Professor Steinberg writes
about private prosecutions in Philadelphia:
[T]he criminal law did have a central place
in the everyday social life of mid-nineteenth-century Philadelphia. Private
prosecution--one citizen taking another to court without the intervention of
the police--was the basis of law enforcement in Philadelphia and an anchor
of its legal culture, and this had been so since colonial times ..... Well
past mid-century, private prosecution remained popular among a broad
spectrum of ordinary Philadelphians. Familiar and frequent, it was rooted in
a complex political and legal structure that linked political parties,
courthouses, saloons and other centers of popular culture, real crime and
dangerous disorder, and ordinary disputes and transgressions of everyday
life ..... Through the process of private prosecution, the criminal courts
of Philadelphia developed a distinctive set of practices and a culture that
was remarkably resilient in the face of constant official hostility and
massive social change.......
He continues:
Private prosecution refers to the system by
which private citizens brought criminal cases to the attention of court
officials, initiated the process of prosecution, and retained considerable
control over the ultimate disposition of cases--especially when compared
with the two main executive authorities of criminal justice, the police and
the public prosecutor ..... Private prosecution ..... [was] firmly rooted in
Philadelphia's colonial past. [It was an] example[] of the creative American
adaptation of the English common law. By the seventeenth century, private
prosecution was a fundamental part of English common law. Most criminal
cases in England proceeded under the control of a private prosecutor,
usually a relatively elite person, and often through a private society
established for that purpose.
Professor Steinberg concludes that before
the second half of the 19th Century, private prosecutions were the
``dominant'' mode of criminal justice in Philadelphia. He explains how this
system worked:
When a person wanted to initiate a criminal
prosecution, he or she went off to the nearest alderman's office,
complained, and usually secured a warrant for the arrest of the accused.
After the alderman's constable escorted the defendant to the office, the
alderman conducted a formal hearing, and the process was underway. Most
often, private prosecutors charged their adversaries with assault and
battery, larceny, or some form of disorderly conduct. Well before 1850,
aldermen and litigants established patterns of case disposition that would
last through most of the century. Most criminal cases were fully disposed of
by the alderman .....
Professor Steinberg also notes that:
[m]uch of the time, people used the
criminal law in their private affairs in order to combat a perceived
injustice or to assert basic rights they felt were violated. There was no
better example of this than battered wives. Women regularly brought charges
against men for assault ...... Most often, ..... the batterer was punished
in some manner .......
And what of the public prosecutor? Contrary
to Senator LEAHY's suggestion that public prosecutors had consolidated
control over prosecutions by the late 18th century, Professor Steinberg
found that--even by the mid-19th Century--the Philadelphia public prosecutor
did little more than act as a clerk to victims who were pursuing private
prosecutions. Here is what Professor Steinberg found:
One of the major reasons for the weakness
of the court officials was the limited power of the public prosecutor. Most
discretion was exercised by the magistrates and private parties, some by the
grand and petit juries, and little by anyone else. As late as the mid-1860s,
for example, jurists agreed that, despite their importance on the streets,
the police had no role in ordinary criminal procedure. More importantly, the
same was basically true for the district attorney. In an 1863 outline of
criminal procedure, Judge Joseph Allison did not mention the police and gave
no discretionary role to the district attorney in the ``usual and ordinary
mode of procedure.'' ....... The discretion of the private parties in
criminal cases was not checked by the public prosecutor. Instead, the public
prosecutor in most cases adopted a stance of passive neutrality. He was
essentially a clerk, organizing the court calendar and presenting cases to
grand and petit juries. Most of the time, he was either superseded by a
private attorney or simply let the private prosecutor and his witnesses take
the stand and state their case.
And the dominance of private prosecutions
was certainly not unique to Philadelphia. Other legal historians who have
sifted through court records have reached similar conclusions to Professor
Steinberg.
In a 1995 article in the American Journal
of Legal History, for example, Robert Ireland concluded that ``By 1820 most
states had established local public prosecutors....... Yet, because of
deficiencies in the office of public prosecutor, privately funded
prosecutors constituted a significant element of the state criminal justice
system throughout the nineteenth century.''
In a 1967 article in the New York
University Law Review, William E. Nelson found that private prosecution was
commonplace in a typical Massachusetts county between 1760 and 1810.
Criminal trials, he writes, were ``in reality contests between subjects
rather than contests between government and subject.''
And the list goes on: other scholars who
have acknowledged the prevalence of private prosecution in the American
colonies and fledgling United States include Richard Gasjins (Connecticut),
Michael S. Hindus (Massachusetts and South Carolina), William M. Lloyd, Jr.
(Pennsylvania), and Edwin Surrency (Philadelphia). Indeed, William F.
McDonald notes in the American Criminal Law Review that a system of private
prosecution was preferred by many around the time of the American Revolution
because of a fear of tyranny associated with government prosecutors and
because it was less expensive.
In the face of this overwhelming historical
evidence that the bulk of prosecutions at the time of the Constitutional
Convention were private, the Senator from Vermont suggested instead that
public prosecutions were ``standard.'' He relied on several sources for that
conclusion: a four-page article in a legal encyclopedia and a few law review
article quotes, one lacking citation and the rest citing the same four-page
encyclopedia article.
Of particular importance seems to be a
quotation from an article in the Rutgers Law Review that asserted that ``[b]y
the time of the Revolution, public prosecution in America was standard, and
private prosecution, in effect, was gone.'' But reading closer, one finds
that the support for this statement was none other than a statement in the
oft-cited four-page encyclopedia [Page: S3251] article that ``by the time of
the American Revolution, each colony had established some form of public
prosecution.......''
Again, however, we have seen that the mere
existence of ``some form of public prosecution'' at the time of the American
Revolution does not mean that public prosecution was ``standard.'' And it
certainly does not mean that public prosecutors handled the bulk of
prosecutions or had much a prosecutorial role. They did not. Rather, the
weight of historical evidence on this subject--a subject which has been
extensively researched and reviewed by some of our country's most
distinguished legal historians and other scholars--suggests that private
prosecutions were dominant.
Mr. President, I am glad to have the chance
to correct the historical record on this point. I have the utmost respect
for my distinguished colleague from Vermont and I thank him for his
thoughtful remarks on the history of prosecution in this country. However, I
believe that my main point stands: we need to restore rights that crime
victims enjoyed at the time the Framers drafted the Constitution and Bill of
Rights.
Even
the Amendment's most ardent critics usually say they support most of the
rights in principle. If there is one thing certain in the victims' rights
debate, it is that these words, "I'm all for victims' rights but . . .," are
heard repeatedly. But while supporting the rights "in principle," opponents in
practice end up supporting, if anything, mere statutory fixes that have proven
inadequate to the task of vindicating the interests of victims. As Attorney
General Reno testified before the House Committee on the Judiciary, ". . .
efforts to secure victims' rights through means other than a constitutional
amendment have proved less than fully adequate." The best federal statutes
have proven inadequate to the needs of even highly publicized victim
injustices, as Professor Cassell's writing about the plight of the Oklahoma
City bombing victims has ably demonstrated.
In my
state, statutes were inadequate to change the justice system. And now, despite
its
successes, we realize
that our state constitutional amendment will also prove inadequate to fully
implement victims' rights. While the amendment has improved the treatment of
victims, it does not provide the unequivocal command that is needed to
completely change old ways. In our state, as in others, the existing rights
too often "fail to provide meaningful protection whenever they come into
conflict with bureaucratic habit, traditional indifference, sheer inertia or
the mere mention of an accused's rights -- even when those rights are not
genuinely threatened." The experience in my state is, sadly, hardly unique. A
recent study by the National Institute of Justice found that "even in States
where victims' rights were protected strongly by law, many victims were not
notified about key hearings and proceedings, many were not given the
opportunity to be heard, and few received restitution." The victims most
likely to be affected by the current haphazard implementation are, perhaps not
surprisingly, racial minorities.
A
group calling itself "Citizens for the Constitution"[hereinafter "Citizens"]
has organized under the auspices of The Century Foundation's Constitution
Project. Their purpose is to call for restraint in the consideration of
Amendments to the U. S. Constitution. In their recent pamphlet,
"Great and Extraordinary Occasions": Developing Guidelines for Constitutional
Change, the group propounds eight guidelines which, they argue,
should be satisfied before any constitutional amendment would be justified.
The "Citizens" raise some questions, in the commentary following their
guidelines, about the Crime Victims' Rights Amendment. Applying these rigorous
Guidelines, however, despite the reservations of the "Citizens" themselves,
demonstrates unequivocal support for the case for the Amendment. I would like
to direct the Subcommittee's attention to these eight guidelines, which the
"citizens" offer in the form of eight questions.
1. Does the proposed amendment address matters that are of more than immediate
concern and that are likely to be recognized as of abiding importance by
subsequent generations?
Yes.
Even as the
Constitutional rights of persons accused or convicted of crimes address issues
of "abiding importance," so to do the proposed rights of crime victims. The
legitimate rights of the accused to notice, to the right to be present and the
right to be heard or remain silent, the right to a speedy and public trial, or
any of the other rights are surely no more enduring than the legitimate
interests of the victim to notice, presence, or the right to be heard, or any
of the other rights proposed by the amendment. Surely no one could
persuasively argue that the rights of the innocent victim were less important
or enduring.
Indeed, it is precisely because these values for victims are of enduring, or
"abiding" importance that they must be protected against erosion by any branch
or majoritarian will. That they do not exist today broadly across the country
is evidence that they are not adequately protected despite general acceptance
of their merit.
2. Does the proposed amendment make our system more politically responsive or
protect individual rights?
Yes.
Clearly the proposed
amendment is offered to "protect individual rights."
That is its sole purpose.
The "Citizens"
however, suggest that Congress should ask "whether crime victims are a
'discreet and insular minority' requiring constitutional protection against
overreaching majorities or whether they can be protected through ordinary
political means. Congress should also ask whether it is appropriate to create
rights for them that are virtually immune from future revision. Let's review
these two questions.
"[O]rdinary
political means" have proven wholly inadequate to establish and protect the
rights reviewed above. If this were not so they would exist and be respected
in every state and throughout the federal government. The evidence that they
are not is as compelling as it is overwhelming. Why is this so? Are crime
victims unpopular? No, but as a class they are ignored; their interests
subordinated to the interests of the defendant and the professionals in the
system. And those interests are entrenched as deeply as any in this society.
Crime victims become "discreet and insular" by virtue of their transparency.
If this were not so we would not be here for our rights would be secure.
3. Are there significant practical or legal obstacles to the achievement of
the objectives of the proposed amendment by other means?
Yes.
The "Citizens" write,
'The proposed victims' rights amendment raises troubling questions under this
Guideline. Witnesses testifying in Congress on behalf of the amendment point
to the success of state amendments as reason to enact a federal counterpart.
But the passage of the state amendments arguably cuts just the other way; for
the most part, states are capable of changing their own law of criminal
procedure in order to accommodate crime victims, without the necessity of
federal constitutional intervention. While state amendments cannot affect
victims' rights in federal courts, Congress has considerable power to furnish
such protections through ordinary legislation. Indeed, it did so in March 1997
with Public Law 105-6 . . . which allowed the victims of the Oklahoma City
bombing to attend trial proceedings."
I
was one of those witnesses the "Citizens" referred to. They should have read
all my testimony. Let me repeat again one of my statements, "In my state, the
statutes were inadequate to change the justice system. And now, despite its
successes, we realize that our state constitutional amendment will also prove
inadequate to fully implement victims' rights. While the amendment has
improved the treatment of victims, it does not provide the unequivocal command
that is needed to completely change old ways. In our state, as in others, the
existing rights too often "fail to provide meaningful protection whenever they
come into conflict with bureaucratic habit, traditional indifference, sheer
inertia or the mere mention of an accused's rights -- even when those rights
are not genuinely threatened." (Quoting Prof. Lawrence Tribe on the proposed
amendment).
Moreover our courts have now made explicit in a series of cases (cited in
Hearing Report on S. J. Res. 6, April 16, 1997, Senate Judiciary Committee)
what was always understood: namely that the U. S. Constitutional rights of the
defendant will always trump any right of the victim without any fair attempt
to balance the rights of both.
On
the Oklahoma City bombing point that the "Citizens" make they should have read
the whole testimony of Prof. Paul Cassell who convincingly demonstrates how
the statute cited by the citizens was inadequate to the task of fully
protecting even these high profile and compelling victims. The law didn't work
for them. How much less must it work for victims who don't have the clout to
get an act of Congress passed? That "other means," to use the "Citizens"
phrase, have simply proven inadequate is concurred in by a broad consensus
that includes the Justice Department, constitutional scholars of the highest
regard from both ends of the political spectrum, the President, the Vice
President, the platforms of both major political parties, and bi-partisan
coalition of Members and Senators, and crime victim advocates throughout our
country.
4. Is the proposed amendment consistent with related constitutional doctrine
that the amendment leaves in tact?
Yes.
The proposed rights
are perfectly consistent with the constitutional doctrine that fundamental
rights for citizens in our justice system need the protection of our
fundamental law.
5. Does the proposed amendment embody enforceable, and not purely aspirational,
standards?
Yes.
The text of the
proposed amendment grants to crime victims constitutional standing to stand
before any judge in the country and seek orders protected the established
rights. This is the essence of enforceability.
6. Have the proponents of the proposed amendment attempted to think through
and articulate the consequences of their proposal, including the ways in which
the amendment would interact with other constitutional provisions and
principles?
Yes.
More than simply
"think through" the proposal, proponents of the CVRA have taken roughly two
decades of experience with state statutes and constitutional provisions to
develop a very refined understanding of the limits of state and federal law,
the need for a federal amendment, and how that amendment would work in actual
practice and be interpreted. No other constitutional amendment has had this
degree of vetting.
7. Has there been full and fair debate on the merits of the proposed
amendment?
Yes.
The Congress has had
the amendment under consideration since 1996. There have been major hearings
in both bodies on multiple occasions. The record of debate and discussion
throughout the country is extensive.
8. Has congress provided for a non-extendable deadline for ratification by the
states so as to ensure that there is a contemporaneous consensus by Congress
and the states that the proposed amendment is desirable?
Yes.
The proposal
establishes a seven-year deadline for State ratification.
Conclusion
The proposed amendment
passes the test of the "Citizens" Guidelines. More importantly, it is fully
faithful to the spirit and design of James Madison.
The
"Citizens'" pamphlet,
Great and Extraordinary Occasions,
takes its name from a
line in
The Federalist
No. 49, authored by James Madison. There Madison rightly argued for restraint
in the use of the amendment process. But of course he rose above rightful
restraint to propose the first twelve amendments.
When
James Madison took to the floor and proposed the Bill of Rights during the
first session of the First Congress, on June 8, 1789, "his primary objective
was to keep the Constitution intact, to save it from the radical amendments
others had proposed . . . ." In doing so he acknowledged that many Americans
did not yet support the Constitution.
"Prudence dictates that advocates of the Constitution take steps now to make
it as acceptable to the whole people of the United States, as it has been
found acceptable to a majority of them."
The
fact is, Madison said, there is still "a great number" of the American people
who are dissatisfied and insecure under the new Constitution. So, "if there
are amendments desired of such a nature as will not injure the constitution,
and they can be ingrafted so as to give satisfaction to the doubting part of
our fellow-citizens," why not, in the spirit of "deference and concession,"
adopt such amendments?
Madison adopted this tone of "deference and concession" because he realized
that the Constitution must be the "will of all of us, not just a majority of
us." By adopting a bill of rights, Madison thought, the Constitution would
live up to this purpose. He also recognized how the Constitution was the only
document which could likely command this kind of influence over the culture of
the country.
Our
goals are perfectly consistent with the goals that animated James Madison.
There is substantial evidence in the land that the Constitution today does not
serve the interests of the "whole people" in matters relating to criminal
justice. And the way to restore balance to the system, in ways that become
part of our culture, is to amend our fundamental law.
"[The
Bill of Rights will] have a tendency to impress some degree of respect for
[the rights], to establish the public opinion in their favor, and rouse the
attention of the whole community . . . [they] acquire, by degrees, the
character of fundamental maxims. . . as they become incorporated with the
national sentiment . . . ."
Critics of Madison's proposed amendments claimed they were unnecessary,
especially so in the
United States, because
states had bills of rights. Madison responded with the observation that "not
all states have bills of rights, and some of those that do have inadequate and
even 'absolutely improper' ones." Our experience in the victims' rights
movement is no different. Not all states have constitutional rights, nor even
adequate statutory rights. There are 33 state constitutional amendments and
they are of varying degrees of value.
Harvard Professor Lawrence Tribe has observed this failure : " . . . there
appears to be a considerable body of evidence showing that, even where
statutory or regulatory or judge-made rules exist to protect the participatory
rights of victims, such rights often tend to be honored in the breach . . . ."
As a consequence he has concluded that crime victims' rights "are the very
kinds of rights with which our Constitution is typically concerned."
After
years of struggle, we now know that the only way to make respect for the
rights of crime victims "incorporated with the national sentiment," is to make
them a part of "the sovereign instrument of the whole people," the
Constitution. Just as James Madison would have done it.
* * *
FORCE 100
Contact Information
(For even more information
see the
website:
www.nvcap.org.)
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